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The theory of sets of desirable gambles is a very general model which covers most of the
existing theories for impreciseprobability as special cases; it hasa clear andsimpleaxiomatic
justification; and mathematical definitions are natural and intuitive. However, much work
remains to be done until the theory of desirable gambles can be considered as generally
applicable to reasoning tasks as other approaches to imprecise probability are. This paper
gives an overview of some of the fundamental concepts for reasoning with uncertainty
expressed in terms of desirable gambles in the finite case, provides a characterization of
regular extension, and studies the nature of maximally coherent sets of desirable gambles,
which correspond to finite sequences of probability distributions, each one of them defined
on the set where the previous one assigns probability zero.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Sets of desirable gambles are powerful and simple models for representing imprecise probabilities and reasoning with
them. For these reasons, they were proposed by Walley [14] as a general model for imprecise probability after studying the
limitations of other models.
The axioms for desirable gambles were introduced by Williams [16], and Walley studied them in Appendix F of his
book [13]. They were also considered by Moral and Wilson [11] as a basis for a logical approach to probability. They are
mathematically equivalent to partial preference orderings [1,7], though simpler [14]. Because of this and its generality,
desirable gambles are a more suitable theory of uncertainty than partial preference orderings and many other alternative
theories of uncertainty. Many available papers use other representations, such as lower and upper previsions, where the
rules for inference are deduced using arguments which are based on desirability. This makes desirability a more primitive
notion, even though its use in the literature is still very limited.
Moral [10] recently studied the concept of epistemic irrelevance in terms of desirable gambles, which resulted in a
very natural approach to this notion, as it allowed to show a number of properties in a simple form. Also, de Cooman and
Quaeghebeur [3–5] have studied exchangeability under the setting of desirability, providing an elegant formalization of
natural and intuitive reasoning processes.
In this paper, we give an overview of some of the main concepts of desirable gambles when the set of possible outcomes
is finite, showing the difference between desirable gambles and almost desirable gambles (Section 2). Then we study the
concept of conditioning, showing how the rules of conditioning for lower previsions can be obtained from the simple
definition of conditioning for sets of desirable gambles and giving conditions in terms of desirable gambles under which the
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use of regular extension is justified (Section 3). One of the problems associated with the use of desirable gambles is the lack
of effectivemethods for representing information and algorithms to draw inferences from the available information. Section
4 discusses this issue and shows that there are algorithms in the literature which can be directly applied in this theory.
Finally, Section 5 studies the case of maximally coherent sets of desirable gambles. These sets always have an associated
precise probability measure. But since sets of desirable gambles can contain more information than probability measures,
we prove that we can associate amore complex structure to themaximal coherent sets: a sequence of probability measures,
each one of them defined on the set in which the previous measure in the sequence assigns a zero probability, similar to
the sequences defined by Krauss [9] and Coletti and Scozzafava [2]. We also show that a general coherent set of desirable
gambles can be expressed in terms of maximal (precise) coherent sets.
2. Sets of desirable gambles
LetΩ = {ω1, . . . , ωn}denote the (finite) set of outcomes.We assume that there is an unknownoutcome value belonging
to Ω . A gamble on Ω is a bounded mapping from Ω toR, i.e., X : Ω → R. Gambles are used to represent an agent’s beliefs
and information. If an agent accepts a gamble X , then the value X(ω) represents the reward she would obtain ifω is the true
unknown outcome (this value can be negative, in which case it represents a loss).
Let L denote the set of all gambles defined on Ω . For X, Y ∈ L, let X ≥ Y mean that X(ω) ≥ Y(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω , and let
X > Y mean that X ≥ Y and X(ω) > Y(ω) for some ω ∈ Ω .
A subsetD ofL is said to be a coherent set of desirable gambles relative toL [14]when it satisfies the following four axioms:
D1. 0 ∈ D,
D2. if X ∈ L and X > 0 then X ∈ D,
D3. if X ∈ D and c ∈ Rwith c > 0 then cX ∈ D,
D4. if X ∈ D and Y ∈ D then X + Y ∈ D.
In what follows, it will be assumed that the information is represented by means of a coherent set of desirable gambles
D. These axioms represent the consistency conditions for the gambles that are considered desirable. For example, Axiom D4
says that if we consider X and Y desirable, then we should consider that the gamble resulting from adding the rewards of
both gambles together is desirable. Axiom D2 says that a positive gamble (a gamble for which we can win, but never lose)
is always desirable.
The null gamble is neutral. We do not allow it to be included in the set of really desirable gambles. In some cases, as in
[10,13], the null gamble has been considered desirable. The real important condition for coherence is that if X < 0, then
X ∈ D (avoiding partial loss). In our approach, this condition is a consequence of D1 and the other axioms (D2 and D4). As D1
is formally different from the avoiding partial loss condition, we will designate it using a different name: avoiding null gain.
Walley first considered the null gamble always desirable in [13], but then he changed his standpoint to consider it as non-
desirable in [14]. Quaeghebeur [12] introduced a third option: Allowing 0 to be desirable but not forcing it. Quaeghebeur’s
approach is equivalent to replacing D1 by the “avoiding partial loss” condition. We believe that this would not have very
important practical consequences. At this stage we find that avoiding null gain is simpler from a formal point of view. It
differs from the “avoiding partial loss” condition also from a semantic perspective. If we just consider the “avoiding partial
loss" axiom, then there may exist a coherent set of desirable gambles containing a gamble X and its opposite −X . We find
more intuitive that a gamble and its opposite cannot be really desirable at the same time. For this reason, apart from formal
simplicity, we have chosen this version of D1. However, we admit that this issue is not completely closed and in the future
new arguments can appear in favour of any of the options for the desirability of the null gamble: forcing, non-allowing, and
allowing (but not forcing).
The gambles in the border of a set of desirable gamblesD play an important role. They are calledmarginal gambles [12,13].
The set of marginal gambles of D is [12]:
GD = {X − sup{a ∈ R : X − a ∈ D} : X ∈ D } (1)
It is immediate to prove that a gamble Y is a marginal gamble ofD if and only if for all a > 0 we have that Y + a ∈ D and
Y − a ∈ D. However, it is not determined whether a marginal gamble Y belongs toD. Somemarginal gambles are desirable
while others are not desirable.
If F is an arbitrary set of gambles, then the set of all gambles obtained by applying axioms D2, D3, and D4 is called the
set of gambles generated by F and it is denoted by F . If this set is coherent (0 ∈ F) then it will be called its natural extension
(the minimum coherent set containing F). If 0 ∈ F wewill say that F does not avoid null gain. Natural extension will make
sense only when F avoids null gain. If X < 0 and X ∈ F , we will say that F does not avoid partial loss.
It is immediate that
F =
⎧⎨
⎩
n∑
i=1
λi Xi : λi > 0, [Xi ∈ F or Xi > 0], n ≥ 1
⎫⎬
⎭ (2)
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Walley [13] defines the natural extension as the set of gambles that dominate (are greater than or equal to) the positive
linear combination of gambles in F . Our definition with positive linear combinations but without dominance is equivalent,
as the combination of positive gambles is allowed.
2.1. Lower previsions
A coherent lower prevision on Ω is a mapping P : L → R that satisfies the following properties [13]:
1. P(X) ≥ inf X
2. ∀c > 0, P(cX) = cP(X)
3. P(X + Y) ≥ P(X) + P(Y)
The dual mapping of a lower prevision, P(X) = −P(−X), is called an upper prevision.
The lower prevision induced by a coherent set D is the function P : L → R defined as follows:
P(X) = sup{c : X − c ∈ D} (3)
A buying price c for X is considered acceptable if and only if X − c is desirable. So, P(X) is the supremum of acceptable
buying prices for X . It is immediate that this lower prevision satisfies the above properties.
The upper prevision induced by D is the function P : L → R defined as follows:
P(X) = inf{c : c − X ∈ D} (4)
A selling price c for X is considered acceptable if and only if c − X is desirable. So P(X) is the infimum of acceptable selling
prices for X . The upper and lower previsions induced by the same coherent set D are dual.
If A is an event (A ⊆ Ω), then P(A) and P(A) are P(1A) and P(1A), respectively, where 1A is the indicator function of A.
It is important to notice that the knowledge of P(A) for any event A ⊆ Ω is not enough to determine P(X) for any gamble
X ∈ L. For this reason, lower previsions are defined for gambles instead of events, as is usual with precise probabilities.
Using coherent lower previsions, marginal gambles can be represented in amore compact way: If X ∈ L, then X−P(X) is
a marginal gamble. It is immediate to prove that X is marginal if and only if P(X) = 0. From the lower prevision of a gamble
X we cannot always determine whether this gamble is desirable. If P(X) > 0, then gamble X is desirable; if P(X) < 0 the
gamble is not desirable. But if X is a marginal gamble, it is not possible to determine its desirability from its lower prevision.
So, given a lower prevision we cannot determine an unique set of desirable gambles inducing it.
A linear prevision is a self-conjugate coherent lower prevision: P(X) = −P(−X). It is equivalent to a finitely additive
probability measure defined on Ω and will be denoted as P. In the case of linear previsions, the knowledge of P(A) on the
events A ⊆ Ω is enough to determine the value of P(X) for general gambles X ∈ L.
2.2. Credal sets
We can associate a credal set, i.e. a closed and convex set of (finitely additive) probability measures or linear previsions,
to any set of gambles. The credal set induced by D is defined as:
PD = {P ∈ M : P(X) ≥ 0 for all X ∈ D} (5)
whereM is the set of all linear previsions defined on L.
This set is non-empty if set D is a coherent set of desirable gambles. In the following, we will always assume non-empty
credal sets.
Conversely, given a non-empty set of linear previsions P , we define
DP = {X ∈ L : P(X) > 0, ∀ P ∈ P} ∪ {X : X > 0} (6)
DP is called the set of strictly desirable gambles associated to P byWalley [13]. If we start with a credal set P and compute
the coherent set of strictly desirable gambles DP , then the original credal set can be recovered by expression [14]:
P = PDP (7)
This equation says that P coincides with the credal set induced by DP .
Credal sets and coherent lower previsions are equivalent models [13, Section 3.3]. A credal set can be obtained from a
lower prevision through the following expression:
P = {P : P(X) ≤ P(X),∀X ∈ L} (8)
And a coherent lower prevision can be obtained froma credal set bymeans of the following expression (the lower envelope
theorem):
P(X) = inf{P(X) : P ∈ P} (9)
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In the above expression, the credal set P can be replaced by its set of extreme points.
Similarly, a coherent upper prevision can be obtained as:
P(X) = sup{P(X) : P ∈ P}
It is immediate to show that if we start with a coherent set of desirable gambles,D, andwe computePD and its associated
lower prevision P, thenPD and P are associatedwith the expressions (8) and (9) above. It is important to notice that the credal
set representation of upper and lower probabilities does not mean that upper and lower previsions always represent our
ignorance about a true probability measure that belongs to the credal set. Lower and upper previsions should be interpreted
in terms of buying and selling prices for gambles. Credal sets are only an alternative representation in terms of (closed and
convex) sets of probabilities.
As pointed out by Walley [14], the representation of uncertainty using sets of desirable gambles is more general than
the representation based on credal sets, as there can be several different sets of desirable gambles with the same associated
credal set. DP is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles with P as the associated credal set. It is straightforward
to see that DP is coherent. The fact that it is the smallest coherent set is formally stated and proved in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Let us assume that P is a credal set andD is a coherent set of gambles such that PD = P . Then it follows that the
set of strictly desirable gambles DP is included in D, i.e., DP ⊆ D.
Proof. If X ∈ DP , then P(X) > 0,∀P ∈ P or X > 0.
If X > 0 then, by Axiom D2, X ∈ D.
If P(X) > 0,∀P ∈ P , then if X ∈ D, and sinceD is convex, by the separating hyperplane theorem [8] it follows that there
is a P′ such that P′(X) ≤ 0 and P′(Y) ≥ 0,∀Y ∈ D, i.e., P′(X) ≤ 0 where P′ ∈ PD = P , which is in contradiction with
P(X) > 0,∀P ∈ P . So we must have that X ∈ D. 
An immediate consequence of the above proposition is that if D is a coherent set of desirable gambles, then DPD ⊆ D.
The following proposition states that the difference between two sets of desirable gambles with the same associated
credal can only lie in which of the marginal gambles are really desirable.
Proposition 2. If D and D′ are coherent sets of desirable gambles such that PD = PD′ , then GD = GD′ and D − D′ ⊆ GD .
Proof. To prove GD = GD′ , consider X ∈ GD and a > 0. Then, we have that X + a ∈ D. Hence, for any P ∈ PD,
P(X + a) ≥ 0. If 0 < a′ < a then P(X + a) > P(X + a′) ≥ 0, and so we also have that for any P ∈ PD, P(X + a) > 0. Given
that PD = PD′ , we obtain that for any P ∈ PD′ , P(X + a) > 0. So X + a ∈ DPD′ ⊆ D′.
Under the same conditions, X ∈ GD and a > 0, there is 0 < a′ < a, and X − a′ ∈ D. By the separating hyperplane
theorem, there is a P′ ∈ PD such that P(X − a′) ≤ 0. Since P′(X − a) < P′(X − a′) ≤ 0, we also have that P′(X − a) < 0.
Given that PD = PD′ , there is a P′ ∈ PD′ such that P′(X − a) < 0. So X − a ∈ D′ (as for any X ∈ D′ and P ∈ PD′ we have
that P(X − a) ≥ 0).
We have proved that X ∈ GD implies that X + a ∈ D′ and X − a ∈ D′, for any a > 0. So, X ∈ GD′ and GD ⊆ GD′ . The
reverse inclusion is obtained by symmetry, so we get the equality.
Now, let us assume that X ∈ D − D′. Being X ∈ D, then for any a > 0 we will also have X + a ∈ D. If X ∈ D′, by the
separating hyperplane theorem, there is a P′ ∈ PD′ such that P′(X) ≤ 0. Therefore, if a > 0 there is a P′ ∈ PD′ such that
P′(X − a) < 0. Given the equality of the associated credal sets, then there is a P′ ∈ PD such that P′(X − a) < 0, and we
obtain that X − a ∈ D. If X ∈ D − D′, we have proved that for any a > 0, X + a ∈ D and X − a ∈ D, i.e. X ∈ GD . 
If we startwith a credal setP ,DP is only one of the coherent sets of desirable gambles that can be associated to it. Another
possible set of desirable gambles associated to P , which includes more gambles than DP , is:
DrP = {X ∈ L : ∀ P ∈ P, P(X) ≥ 0, and ∃P ∈ P : P(X) > 0} ∪ {X : X > 0} (10)
This set of desirable gambles will be associated to one of the possible definitions of conditioning in P as we will see in
the next section.
2.3. Natural extension
If we start with a coherent lower prevision P, we can consider how to transform this lower prevision into a set of desirable
gambles. This problem can be solved in the following way:
1. We compute the credal set P associated to P (both are equivalent representations).
2. We compute DP from P . This coherent set of desirable gambles is the least informative set of desirable gambles
associated to P (henceforth, P).
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It can be easily checked that this set of desirable gambles coincides with the set DP generated by gambles {X +  − a :
 > 0, P(X) = a, X ∈ L}:
DP = {X − P(X) +  :  > 0, X ∈ L}
This set has been proposed as the coherent set of desirable gambles associated to a lower prevision by Quaeghebeur [12,
Section 1.2.2].
If we start with a lower prevision, P, defined on a partial set of gambles K ⊆ L, then natural extension [13] allows to
extend it to a lower prevision defined on the full set of gambles. The procedure can be also expressed in terms of desirable
gambles [12, Section 1.2.3] as follows:
1. Compute the set of desirable gambles associated to P: DP = {X − P(X) +  :  > 0, X ∈ K}.
2. Compute the set of gambles generated byDP ,DP , using expression (2). If this set is coherent, the partial lower prevision
is said to avoid null gain.
3. Compute the lower prevision, E, associated to DP using expression (3). This only makes sense when DP is coherent in
the previous step.
It follows immediately that in this case (a set of desirable gambles built from a lower prevision) the two conditions,
avoiding sure loss and avoiding null gain, are equivalent: If 0 can be obtained by applying axioms D2, D3, and D4 to gambles
in DP , then decreasing the  of one of the gambles in DP we have used to get the null gamble, we obtain a gamble X < 0.
The new values for E(X) can be different from P(X) if X ∈ K. When all the new values are equal to the original ones, we
will say that the partial lower prevision is coherent. If DP avoids null gain and P is not coherent, then DP is refined by its
natural extension: we always have E(X) ≥ P(X) for any X ∈ K.
If we only have a single assignment P(X) = a, this assignment is represented by the set of gambles {X +  − a :  > 0}.
The set of gambles associated to a partial lower prevision is the union of the set of gambles, each representing its individual
assignments.
2.4. Desirability, almost desirability, and strict desirability
A coherent set D∗ of almost desirable gambles is a set of gambles which satisfies axioms D2, D3, and D4, as well as the
following two axioms (the first one is a modification of the corresponding axiom for desirable gambles; the new version is
called avoiding sure loss):
D1’. −1 ∈ D∗,
D5. if ∀ > 0, X +  ∈ D∗, then X ∈ D∗.
A set of almost desirable gambles D∗ can define a lower prevision, an upper prevision, and a credal set, by means of
expressions completely analogous to the case of desirable gambles. But now, from a credal setP , the associated set of almost
desirable gambles D∗P is given by:
D∗P = {X ∈ L : P(X) ≥ 0, ∀ P ∈ P} (11)
There is a one-to-one correspondence through Eqs. (5) and (11) between coherent sets of almost desirable gambles and
credal sets [13, Section 3.8], and the two representations are equivalent.
The set of marginal gambles of a coherent set of almost desirable gambles is defined identically to the set of marginal
gambles of a coherent set of desirable gambles. The difference is that in the case of almost desirable gambles, all themarginal
gambles are almost desirable: If X ∈ GD∗ = {Y − sup{a ∈ R : Y − a ∈ D∗}}, then X +  ∈ D∗ for any  > 0, and applying
Axiom D5, X ∈ D∗.
Intuitively, the set of desirable gambles contains all the gambles that are really desirable, i.e. the agent has reasons to
accept them as desirable. The set of almost desirable gambles also includes all the gambles that are limits of desirable
gambles, though some of them, such as the null gamble, are not really desirable. It can be even the case that a gamble X < 0,
which is clearly undesirable, is almost desirable.
A coherent set of strictly desirable gamblesD+ is a set of gambles satisfying axioms D1, D3, and D4, aswell as the following
axioms:
D2’. if X ∈ L and ∀ω ∈ Ω, X(ω) > 0 then X ∈ D+,
D6. if X ∈ D+ then there is a δ > 0 such that X − δ ∈ D+.
Walley [13, p. 155] considers a slightly different definition of strict desirability. In his version, all gambles X > 0 are
considered to be strictly desirable. Here, we only assume that the gambles that are positive for any value of ω ∈ Ω must
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be strictly desirable. The difference is not essential and we have preferred this option because the properties are simpler
to state, as with Walley’s approach we have to make many exceptions for these gambles. For example, we consider that
a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles is always open, while Walley requires that a coherent set of strictly desirable
gambles, excluding gambles X > 0, is open.
This definition is not satisfied by the set of strictly desirable gambles associated toP : DP (see expression (6)). In order to
satisfy this definition, gambles {X : X > 0} should not be added to DP . This is a very small difference without behavioural
implications and we have kept the same terminology than in Walley for set DP .
Given a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles D+, we can also define a credal set by means of Eq. (5). And given a
credal set P , we can define its associated set of strictly desirable gambles by means of expression:
D+P = {X ∈ L : P(X) > 0 for all P ∈ P} (12)
Coherent sets of strictly desirable gambles and coherent sets of almost desirable gambles are equivalent models in the
sense that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two models. We can also define the set of marginal gambles
associated to a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles using the same expression (1). The following proposition shows
that the difference between them is that all the marginal gambles are almost desirable, but not strictly desirable.
Proposition 3. If D∗ is a coherent set of almost desirable gambles and D+ is a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles, such
that the credal set associated to both of them is the same credal set P , then D+ ⊆ D∗ and (D∗ − D+) = GD∗ = GD+ .
Proof.The inclusion is immediate taking into account thatD∗ = D∗P andD+ = D+P for the samecredal setP , andexpressions
(11) and (12) which represent D∗P and D+P as functions of P .
Now, let us prove that GD∗ = GD+ . Y is a marginal gamble of GD∗ if and only if Y + a ∈ D∗ and Y − a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0.
This is equivalent to:
∀a > 0, P(Y + a) ≥ 0, for all P ∈ P and P(Y − a) < 0 for some P ∈ P.
But ∀a > 0, P(Y + a) ≥ 0, is equivalent to ∀a > 0, P(Y + a) > 0. And “∀a > 0 there is P ∈ P such that P(Y − a) < 0”
is equivalent to “∀a > 0 there is P ∈ P such that P(Y − a) ≤ 0”. Therefore, the above condition is equivalent to
∀a > 0, P(Y + a) > 0, for all P ∈ P and for some P ∈ P, P(Y − a) ≤ 0.
As P is the credal set associated to D+, we have that this is equivalent to Y + a ∈ D+ and Y − a ∈ D+ for any a > 0, i.e.
Y ∈ GD+ .
Now, let us prove that D∗ − D+ = GD∗ . We already showed that any marginal gamble of D∗ is in D∗ (by application of
Axiom D5). We have to prove that any marginal gamble of D∗ (or equivalently of D+) is not in D+. This is simple to prove:
If Y is a marginal gamble of D+, then Y − a ∈ D+ for any a > 0, and by Axiom D6 we can conclude that Y ∈ D+. 
The difference between strict desirability and almost desirability lies in the marginal gambles, which are always al-
most desirable and never strictly desirable. When dealing with desirability, marginal gambles are sometimes desirable and
sometimes not desirable. The capability of distinguishing those really desirable gambles from the rest of the marginal gam-
bles provides greater expressiveness to desirability than other representations, like credal sets, strict desirability, almost
desirability, and lower previsions. The following result shows the relationships between desirability and almost desirability.
Proposition 4. If D is a coherent set of desirable gambles and D∗ is a coherent set of almost desirable gambles such that the
credal set associated to both of them is the same credal set P , then D ⊆ D∗ and (D∗ − D) ⊆ GD∗ = GD .
Proof. First, we prove that D ⊆ D∗. Let us assume Y ∈ D. Since P is the credal set associated to D, we have that ∀P ∈
P, P(Y) ≥ 0. Now, taking into account the expression of D∗ as a function of P (expression (11)), we obtain that Y ∈ D∗.
For the proof of (D∗ −D) ⊆ GD∗ , consider Y ∈ (D∗ −D), then Y ∈ D∗ and therefore Y + a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0. We also
have that Y ∈ D. Since D is a convex set, there is a probability measure P such that P(Y) ≤ 0 and P(X) ≥ 0 for any X ∈ D
(this is a consequence of the separating hyperplane theorem for convex sets [8]). As P(X) ≥ 0 for any X ∈ D, we have that
P ∈ P , and since P(Y) ≤ 0, it follows that P(Y − a) < 0 for any a > 0. As there is a P ∈ P with P(Y − a) < 0 for any a > 0,
we have that Y − a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0.
We have proved that Y + a ∈ D∗ and Y − a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0. Therefore, Y ∈ GD∗ .
Finally, we are going to prove that GD∗ = GD .
If Y ∈ GD∗ , then Y − a ∈ D∗ and Y + a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0.
Since D ⊆ D∗ and Y + a cannot be marginal (and, therefore, Y + a ∈ D) if Y is marginal, we have that Y − a ∈ D and
Y + a ∈ D for any a > 0, and Y ∈ GD .
Conversely, if Y ∈ GD we have that Y − a ∈ D and Y + a ∈ D for any a > 0.
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Fig. 1. Desirable and almost desirable gambles.
As D ⊆ D∗, we have that Y + a ∈ D∗. On the other hand, if Y − a ∈ D∗, then Y − a is a marginal gamble of D∗, and
Y − a/2 is in D∗ and it is not marginal. Therefore, Y − a/2 ∈ D, which contradicts the fact that Y − a ∈ D for any a > 0. As
a consequence, Y − a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0.
As Y − a ∈ D∗ and Y + a ∈ D∗ for any a > 0, we have that Y ∈ GD∗ . 
As a consequence of the above propositions, the difference between a coherent set of desirable gambles, a coherent set of
almost desirable gambles, and a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles, all of them with the same associated credal set,
is that the set of almost desirable gambles includes all the marginal gambles, the set of strictly desirable gambles does not
contain any of the marginal gambles, and the set of desirable gambles may contain some of them (but not all of them). In
topological terms, the difference between desirable and almost desirable gambles is that a set of almost desirable gambles
is always closed, and a set of desirable gambles is never closed (the null gamble is the limit of desirable gambles and it is
never desirable) but not necessarily open either. The set of strictly desirable gambles is always open.
A credal set is a convex and closed set of probabilities and an almost desirable gamble can be interpreted as a linear
restriction on the probabilities in the credal set by means of expression P(X) ≥ 0. The following example illustrates these
relationships from a geometric perspective representing gambles by linear restrictions.
Example 1. Linear previsions on a frame with three elements Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} can be represented in the probability
simplex [13, Section 4.2.3]. This triangle is an equilateral triangle with altitudes of length 1. Each probability is represented
by one point in which the probabilities assigned to each element are identified with the distances to each of the trian-
gle edges. This triangle can be seen as the intersection of the hyperplane x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 in the three dimensional
Euclidean space with the positive orthant (xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3), in which the distances are rescaled so that the coordi-
nates can be computed as the distances to the edges. Any probability P on Ω belongs to this triangle (where each distance
xi represents the probability P({ωi}). A credal set is a convex and closed set in this triangle, like the credal set P rep-
resented in Fig. 1. Let us assume that D and D∗P are a coherent set of desirable gambles, and the coherent set of almost
desirable gambles associated to it, respectively. A gamble X = 0 can be associated to a hyperplane defined by the equality
P(X) = 0. If the gamble is desirable, almost desirable, or strictly desirable, we can associate the inequality P(X) ≥ 0 to
it. If X > 0, all the probabilities in the probability simplex would satisfy P(X) ≥ 0 and the gamble will be said to be
trivial. If gamble X is not trivial and avoids sure loss (there is an i value with X({ωi}) ≥ 0) and we see the associated
hyperplane P(X) = 0 in the 3-dimensional space, this will cut the probability simplex as a segment (it can be a point in
some degenerated cases) dividing the triangle in two parts. In one of the two parts (which includes the hyperplane) all the
restrictions P(X) ≥ 0 are satisfied, and therefore any credal set associated to a desirable set of gambles containing X should
be included in it. So, in the probability simplex a non-trivial gamble avoiding sure loss is represented as a segment and a
direction.
A gamble X is almost desirable if all the probabilities in the credal set fulfill the restriction P(X) ≥ 0, i.e. the credal set
is included in the part of the triangle corresponding to the direction associated to X . Furthermore, it is strictly desirable if
all the probabilities satisfy the strict inequality P(X) > 0. Almost desirability is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for desirability. On the other side, strict desirability is sufficient, but not necessary. In the figure, the gamble X1 is strictly
desirable, X2 is not almost desirable and X3 is almost desirable, but not strictly desirable (it is a marginal gamble). So, it
cannot be determined from the credal set P whether the gamble X3 (touching the border of the credal set) is desirable or
not. These gambles in the border (those gambles for which P(X) ≥ 0 for any P, but P(X) = 0 for some P) are the marginal
gambles and determine the difference between desirability, almost desirability, and strict desirability. They have behavioural
consequences, in particular after conditioning on events of probability 0.
Given a coherent set of desirable gambles,D, we can compute the coherent set of almost desirable gamblesA(D)with the
same associated credal set (by adding all the marginal gambles).A(D) is called the set of almost desirable gambles associated
to D. D and A(D) have the same associated credal set. In fact, we have that A(D) = D∗PD , where PD is computed using Eq.
(5) and then D∗PD using Eq. (11).
I. Couso, S. Moral / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1034–1055 1041
3. Conditioning
Let us consider a coherent set of desirable gambles D on Ω . Let B denote (the indicator function of) an arbitrary subset
of Ω . The set of B-desirable gambles [13, Section 6.1.6] can be defined as follows:
DB = {X ∈ L : BX ∈ D} ∪ {X : X > 0}.
This set will be also called the set of conditional desirable gambles given B. This set is determined by those gambles Y that
are desirable and which are also null outside B, i.e. nothing happens if B does not occur. A gamble X belongs to DB if BX is
equal to one of these gambles or positive.
As we have pointed out in Section 2, in [13] it is considered that the 0 gamble is always desirable, while in this paper the
0 gamble is not desirable. This gives rise to a small difference in the definition of conditioning: If we consider that 0 ∈ D,
then we do not have to add gambles X > 0 explicitly, because all these gambles satisfy BX ∈ D.
The gambles in X ∈ D such that X(ω) = 0, for any ω ∈ B are called the basic conditional gambles given B, or basic
B-desirable gambles. This set, denoted by DbB, is enough to determine the conditional set DB. In fact, it can be easily checked
that DB is the natural extension of the set of gambles {X − Bc : X ∈ DbB}, where Bc is the complementary set of B.
A coherent set of desirable gambles D′ in Ω is a conditional set of gambles given B for some coherent set D if and only if
D′B = D′. The proof can be easily obtained by considering that if D′B = D′ then D′ is a conditional set, and that if DB = D′,
then if we condition both sets to B, we obtain (DB)B = D′B. As (DB)B = DB and DB = D′, we get D′B = D′.
Assume that we have a coherent set of gamblesD′ onΩ which is equal to a coherent set of gamblesD given B, i.e. there is
D such thatDB = D′. If wewant to extendD′ to an unconditional set of gambles onΩ , then analogously to natural extension,
we should consider the least informative coherent set (smallest coherent set) D↑ΩB such that its conditional set is D′, i.e.
(D↑ΩB )B = D′, or equivalently the intersection of all coherent sets of gambles such that the conditioning to B gives rise to
D′. This extension can be easily obtained from the set of basic conditional gambles in D′ given B. In fact, it is the natural
extension of D′bB. It can be checked that if D′ is coherent, then the set of gambles generated by D′
b
B is coherent, and that any
gamble in D′bB must belong to any coherent set of gambles D such that DB = D′.
The following results relate this definition with the usual concept in the associated credal set, consisting in computing
the conditional probability given B of all the probability measures in the credal set (when P(B) > 0 for all the probabilities).
In all of them, D∗ is the set of almost desirable gambles associated to the set of desirable gambles D: D∗ = A(D). When
lower and upper previsions are considered (P(X) and P(X)) these are the lower and upper previsions induced byD bymeans
of Eqs. (3) and (4).
Lemma 5. Let D ⊂ L be a coherent set of desirable gambles and B a subset of Ω such that P(B) > 0. Then:
X ∈ D∗ ⇒ ∀  > 0, X + B ∈ D.
Proof. According to the above hypotheses, P(B) > 0, and thus there exists some c > 0 such that B − c ∈ D. Furthermore,
the gamble X + c is assumed to belong to D, for all  > 0. By the coherence of D, the gambles (B − c) = B − c and
X +  B = (X + c) + (B − c) belong to it, for each  > 0, and thus the thesis of the lemma is checked. 
Lemma 6. Let D ⊂ L be a coherent set of desirable gambles satisfying the condition:
X ∈ D∗ and − X ∈ D∗ ⇒ X ∈ D. (13)
Then, for any subset B of Ω such that P(B) > 0, the following condition is also fulfilled:
X ∈ D∗ ⇒ ∀  > 0, X +  B ∈ D.
Proof. Let us assume that X ∈ D∗. The non-negative gamble B also belongs to D∗ and therefore, by the coherence of D∗,
X + B ∈ D∗. To prove that this gamble is also in D, we only have to prove that −(X + B) ∈ D∗, i.e., there exists some
′′ > 0 such that−(X + B) + ′′ ∈ D. Let us check it by contradiction. Let us suppose that ′′ − (X + B) ∈ D, ∀ ′′ > 0.
Then the gamble ′′′ + ′′ − B = (X + ′′′) + [′′ − (X + B)] belongs to D, for all ′′, ′′′ > 0 by the coherence of D. But
the last assertion contradicts the assumption P(B) > 0. 
The following lemma shows that any probability measure P in the credal set induced by the conditional credal set DB is
a probability with P(B) = 1.
Lemma 7. If D is a coherent set of desirable gambles and B ⊆ Ω , then if P ∈ PDB we have that P(B) = 1.
Proof. Let Bc denote the (indicator function of) the complementary of B. The thesis of this lemma is a consequence of the
fact that any gamble Y = −Bc + B where  > 0 is in DB as YB = B > 0, and therefore YB ∈ D.
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As Y ∈ DB, any probability in P ∈ PDB must satisfy that P(Y) = −P(Bc) + P(B) ≥ 0. As  > 0 is arbitrary, this only
can be true if P(Bc) = 0 and P(B) = 1. 
Theorem 8. Let D ⊂ L be a coherent set of desirable gambles and let B be a subset of the universe Ω. Let us assume that the
following condition holds:
X ∈ D∗ ⇒ ∀  > 0, X +  B ∈ D. (14)
Then,
PDB = (PD)|B,
where (PD)|B denotes the set of linear previsions
(PD)|B = {P(·|B) : P ∈ PD and P(B) > 0},
and, for each P with P(B) > 0, P(·|B) is defined as follows:
P(X|B) = P(BX)
P(B)
, ∀ X ∈ L.
Proof. First, let us prove that (PD)|B ⊆ PDB . If Q ∈ (PD)|B, then Q = P(.|B), where P ∈ PD and P(B) > 0.
If X ∈ DB, then either X > 0, and hence the inequality Q(X) ≥ 0 is satisfied, or XB ∈ D. In the last case, as P ∈ PD , we
have that P(XB) ≥ 0, and as Q = P(.|B), then Q(X) = Q(XB) = P(XB)
P(B)
≥ 0. Given that Q(X) ≥ 0 for any X ∈ DB, we can
conclude that Q ∈ PDB .
To prove the other inclusion PDB ⊆ (PD)|B, we will prove first that for any gamble X , if the restriction P(X) ≥ 0 is
satisfied by all the probabilities in (PD)|B, then it will also be satisfied by the probabilities in PDB . As by duality, a convex set
is determined by the set of linear constraints it satisfies; if PDB satisfies all the restrictions satisfied by (PD)|B, the inclusion
follows.
Assume that X is a gamble and ∀P ∈ (PD)|B, P(X) ≥ 0. Then, we have that ∀Q ∈ PD, Q(X|B) ≥ 0, with Q(B) > 0.
Since Q(X|B) = Q(XB)/Q(B) if Q(B) > 0 and Q(XB) = 0 if Q(B) = 0, we have that ∀Q ∈ PD,Q(XB) ≥ 0. This implies
that XB is in the set of almost desirable gambles associated to PD: XB ∈ D∗.
Now, by condition (14) we have that ∀ > 0, XB+ B ∈ D. By the definition ofDB, we obtain that ∀ > 0, XB+ B ∈
DB. This implies that ∀ > 0,∀P ∈ PDB , P(XB+ B) ≥ 0, and therefore ∀P ∈ PDB , P(XB) ≥ 0. Since all the probabilities
in P ∈ PDB are such that P(Bc) = 0 (see Lemma 7), then we have that P(X) = P(XB) + P(XBc) = P(XB) ≥ 0 and the
inequality P(X) ≥ 0 is also satisfied by all the probabilities P ∈ PDB . 
According to Lemmas 5 and 6, and Theorem 8, we derive the following corollary:
Corollary 9. Let D ⊂ L be a coherent set of desirable gambles and let B be an arbitrary subset of the universe Ω. Let us assume
that one of the following conditions holds:
(1) P(B) > 0.
(2) P(B) > 0 and D ⊂ L satisfies the restriction considered in Eq. (13).
Then:
PDB = (PD)|B.
Remark 3.1. When P(B) > 0, the set of linear previsions (PD)|B can be written as follows:
(PD)|B = {P(·|B) : P ∈ PD},
since the condition P(B) > 0 becomes redundant.
This corollary shows theknownfact thatwhenP(B) > 0, conditioning (in termsof credal sets) canbedonebyconditioning
all the probability measures.
However, when P(B) = 0 the conditional credal set is not uniquely determined by the unconditional credal set P . We
can have different coherent sets of desirable gambles, D1 and D2, with the same associated credal set P and such that the
credal sets associated to D1B and D2B are different. The following theorem determines the two extreme cases.
Theorem 10. Let us assume that D is a coherent set of desirable gambles, P = PD is a credal set associated to it, and B ⊆ Ω .
Then, the credal set PDB satisfies the following inclusion:
P|B ⊆ PDB ⊆ VB
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where P|B is defined as in Theorem 8 and VB is the vacuous credal set on B: The set of all probability measures satisfying P(B) = 1.
Furthermore, ifD′ is the set of strictly desirable gambles associated to P , i.e.D′ = DP (see expression (6)) and P(B) = 0, then
PD′B = VB; if D′′ is obtained from P as in expression (10), i.e. D′′ = DrP , and P(B) > 0, then PD′′B = P|B.
Proof. For the inclusionP|B ⊆ PDB , assume that P ∈ P|B, we are going to prove that P ∈ PDB . If P ∈ P|B, then there is aQP ∈ P
such that P = QP(.|B) where Q(B) > 0. As P is the set of probabilities associated to D, we have that QP(X) ≥ 0,∀X ∈ D.
If we assume that Y ∈ DB, then Y > 0 or BY ∈ D. In the former case, it is immediate to prove that for P ∈ P|B,
P(Y) = QP(Y |B) ≥ 0. Now, if BY ∈ D, we have that QP(BY) ≥ 0, and since P(Y) = QP(YB)/QP(B), we have that P(Y) ≥ 0.
We have proved that if P ∈ P|B, then for any Y ∈ DB we have that P(Y) ≥ 0. So P ∈ PDB .
Consider now the inclusion PDB ⊆ VB. As VB is the vacuous credal set on B, we only have to show that for any P ∈ PDB ,
P(B) = 1 and this was proved in Lemma 7.
Let us prove that ifD′ is the set of strictly desirable gambles associated toP and P(B) = 0, thenPD′B = VB. Remember that
if D′ = DP , then D′ = {X : P(X) > 0, ∀P ∈ P} ∪ {X : X > 0}. Then D′B = {X : P(XB) > 0, ∀P ∈ P} ∪ {X : XB > 0}.
P being a closed set and taking into account that P(B) = 0, we have that there is a probability P ∈ P such that P(B) = 0,
and then {X : P(XB) > 0, ∀P ∈ P} = ∅, i.e. D′B = {X : XB > 0}. It is not difficult to show that the credal set associated
to this D′B is VB: Since D′B is a conditional set, by Lemma 7 any probability in PD′B satisfies P(B) = 1 and belongs to VB. On
the other hand, any probability P ∈ VB satisfies that P(B) = 1 and therefore P(X) ≥ 0 if X ∈ D′B, i.e. XB > 0, and belongs
to PD′B .
Finally, let us prove that if D′′ is obtained from P as in expression (10), i.e. D′′ = DrP , and P(B) > 0, then PD′′B = P|B.
Given that P|B ⊆ PD′′B , we only have to prove that PD′′B ⊆ P|B. To do it, we are going to use duality showing that for any
gamble X such that the inequality P(X) ≥ 0 is satisfied by any P ∈ P|B, then this inequality is also satisfied by any P ∈ PD′′B .
Let us assume that X satisfies P(X) ≥ 0 for any P ∈ P|B and P(B) > 0, then we can prove the following facts:
1. As all the probabilities P ∈ P|B are such that P(Bc) = 0, we have that P(XB) ≥ 0 for any P ∈ P|B.
2. If Q ∈ P , then either Q(B) = 0 or Q(.|B) ∈ P|B. In the former case, it is immediate that Q(XB) ≥ 0. In the latter
case, Q(XB) = Q(XB|B)Q(B) ≥ 0 (we have that Q(XB|B) ≥ 0, because Q(.|B) ∈ P|B). So, for any Q ∈ P we have
that Q(XB) ≥ 0.
3. Consider (X + )B where  > 0. We have that Q((X + )B) = Q(XB) + Q(B) ≥ 0.
4. Wehave assumed that P(B) > 0, so there is a probabilityQ0 ∈ P such thatQ0(B) > 0.Wehave thatQ0((X+)B) =
Q0(XB) + Q0(B). As Q0(XB) ≥ 0 and Q0(B) > 0, we have that Q0((X + )B) > 0 for any  > 0.
5. Given that D′′ is obtained from P as in expression (10) and what we have proved in points 3 and 4, we obtain that
(X + )B ∈ D′′ for any  > 0.
6. Given the definition of D′′B , this implies that (X + ) ∈ D′′B for any  > 0.
7. Now, taking into account the definition of PD′′B , if P ∈ PD′′B we have that P(X + ) = P(X) +  ≥ 0 for any  > 0.
So, if P ∈ PD′′B , then P(X) ≥ 0, i.e. the inequality P(X) ≥ 0 is satisfied by any P ∈ PD′′B . 
We have said that, in terms of credal sets, when P(B) > 0, conditioning can be done by conditioning all the probability
measures. But there can be different optionswhen P(B) = 0 and P(B) > 0. There is a least informative optionwhich consists
in selecting VB as the associated conditional credal set. This option is called conditioning by natural extension [13]. And there
is a most informative option, which consists in considering that conditioning is P|B. This option is called conditioning by
regular extension [13]. In Theorem 10we have also shown that these two extreme options are associated to specific coherent
sets of desirable gambles (the set of strictly desirable gambles, DP , in the case of conditioning by natural extension and
the set defined by expression (10) in the case of conditioning by regular extension). When P(B) = 0, both definitions of
conditioning assign the vacuous conditional credal set VB as the conditional credal set. This conditional credal set is obtained
using the coherent set of desirable gambles obtained with expression (6) or the coherent set obtained with expression (10).
So, expression (6) is consistent with natural extension and (10) with regular extension in all possible situations. However,
if we start with the coherent set of desirable gambles D, there are other possible sets for D in which P(B) = 0; hence, the
conditioning can be computed as DB and the associated credal set may be more informative than VB.
Corollary 9 states that if condition in expression (13) is satisfied, then regular extension is obtained. Expression (13) does
not make reference to the associated credal set, but only to properties of desirability of gambles. So, it is a procedure to
determine the use of conditioning by regular extension expressed in terms of desirability. This condition can be seen as a
weaker version of Axiom D5, as here an almost desirable gamble X is also desirable when −X is not almost desirable. Such
condition admits a behavioral justification. If X and −X are both almost desirable and we were accepting both of them as
desirable, then we would obtain that the null gamble is desirable, and then the associated set would not be coherent. But,
if X is almost desirable and−X is not, then it could be considered that we have some reasons to assume that X is desirable.
We have shown here that this implies regular extension, when considering the associated credal sets.
Example 2. Let us assume that we have the credal set of Fig. 2a and that we want to compute the credal set conditional on
B = {ω1, ω2}, and that the points P with P(B) = 1 are the triangle base. In this case, the basic conditional gambles given B
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Fig. 2. Conditional gambles.
are those gamblesX such thatX(ω3) = 0, andwhen this gamble is non-trivial, the associated linear restrictions pass through
the vertex opposite to the triangle base. When the credal set does not contain this vertex (P(B) > 0), there are desirable
conditional gambles that determine that the conditional credal set is the thick segment represented in the base and that it is
equal to the projection of all the probabilities in the credal set from the upper vertex (the projection of a probability P is its
conditional probability P(.|B)). In other words, the set of linear restrictions associated to the conditional gambles (passing
through the upper vertex) that are strictly desirable (all the probabilities that satisfy the linear restrictions and do not touch
the credal set) as the one in the figure are enough to restrict the set of conditional probabilities to the segment in the figure.
However, when P(B) = 0, the upper vertex lies in in the credal set, as shown in Fig. 2b, and all the conditional gambles
like the one depicted in the figure are touching the border of the credal set (they are marginal gambles) and therefore
their desirability is not determined by the credal set. The set of conditional desirable gambles could contain only the trivial
gambles, inwhich case the conditional credal setwould be the full base (the natural extension using the generalized Bayes rule
[13]). It could be also a more restrictive one and include all the gambles with linear restrictions satisfied by the probabilities
in the segment AC (the smallest possible conditional credal set: the regular extension), or something between these two
extremes.
Next we are going to relate the introduced concept of conditioning with the Generalized Bayes Rule [13], which represents
the compatibility relationships that must be satisfied by unconditional and conditional previsions. The conditional lower
and upper previsions, P(X|B) and P(X|B), are computed using the same expressions but considering the conditional set DB
of desirable gambles:
P(X|B) = sup{c : X − c ∈ DB} = sup{c : (X − c)B ∈ D} (15)
P(X|B) = inf{c : c − X ∈ DB} = inf{c : (c − X)B ∈ D} (16)
Proposition 11. If we consider a set of desirable gambles D, and a conditional set of desirable gambles DB where B ⊆ Ω , then
assuming that lower previsions P and P(·|B) are computed using expressions (3) and (15) we have that the following equality
(Generalized Bayes Rule) is satisfied for any gamble X ∈ L:
P(B(X − P(X|B))) = 0
Proof. P(B(X − P(X|B))) is the supremum of values c such that B(X − P(X|B)) − c ∈ D.
From expression (15) we can deduce that if d′ > P(X|B) then (X − d′)B ∈ D, and if d′ < P(X|B), then (X − d′)B ∈ D.
If c > 0, then B(X − P(X|B)) − c ≤ B(X − P(X|B)) − Bc = B(X − (P(X|B) + c)), and since P(X|B) + c > P(X|B), we
have that B(X − P(X|B)) − c ∈ D.
If c < 0, then B(X − P(X|B)) − c ≥ B(X − P(X|B)) − Bc = B(X − (P(X|B) + c)), and since P(X|B) + c < P(X|B), we
have that B(X − P(X|B)) − c ∈ D.
From these two conditions, we can conclude that the supremum of values c such that B(X − P(X|B)) − c ∈ D is 0.
Therefore, P(B(X − P(X|B))) is equal to 0. 
From the generalized Bayes rule, and when P(B) > 0, Walley [13] obtains that the conditional lower previsions can be
computed fromunconditional lower previsions, as it can be proved that there is an unique valueμ such that P(B(X−μ)) = 0
and this value of μ is the conditional prevision P(X|B). However, when P(B) = 0, conditional lower previsions are not
determined from unconditional ones. If what we have is a coherent set of desirable gambles, D, we can always compute a
coherent conditional prevision by computing DB and then the associated lower prevision.
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Now we are going to consider the representation of an expression P(X|B) = a by means of a set of desirable gambles.
Remember that an unconditional prevision assignation P(X) = a can be represented by the set of desirable gambles
{X − a+  :  > 0}, so if this set of gambles is coherent (which is equivalent to min X ≥ a), then it is the least informative
set of gambles for which P(X) = a. Analogously, we can represent P(X|B) = a using a set of desirable gambles F such
that if there is a coherent set of desirable gambles for which P(X|B) = a (computed according to expression (15)), then F
is coherent and its natural extension is the least informative set of gambles for which P(X|B) = a (computed according to
expression (15)). It is not difficult to prove that the set of gambles {(X−a+)B :  > 0} satisfies this property. The proof is
immediate taking into account that if this set is coherent, its natural extension satisfies that P(X|B) = a and that any other
coherent set for which P(X|B) = amust contain any gamble (X − a + )B where  > 0.
From a behavioral perspective, the desirability of gambles (X − a+ )Bwhere  > 0, implies that given that P(X|B) = a,
then for any  > 0, we are ready to pay a −  to get reward X(ω), if B happens.
The natural extension of a family of expressions (P(Xi|Bi) = ai)i∈I allows us to compute a conditional lower prevision for
any gamble X conditional on an event B, E(X|B), and can be defined in terms of gambles in a similar form to the unconditional
case:
1. Compute the set of desirable gambles associated to all the conditional assessments: F = ⋃i∈I{(Xi − ai + )Bi :
 > 0}.
2. Compute the set of gambles generated byF:F . If this set is coherent, then the initial assessments (P(Xi|Bi) = ai)i∈I
are said to avoid null gain.
3. In that case, we can compute the value E(X|B) from F using expression (15) with D = F .
Again, when we have a set of gambles F computed from a set of conditional lower previsions assessments, the condition
of avoiding partial loss is equivalent to the condition of avoiding null gain.
4. Introduction to representation and algorithms
A very important issue to make desirable gambles useful in practice is to determine an effective method to represent
information and to develop algorithms able toworkwith this representation. In particular, wewould like to have procedures
that take a set of desirable gambles F as input and are able to carry out the following basic reasoning tasks:
1. Determine whether the natural extension F is coherent (i.e. F avoids null gain),
2. Given X, determine whether X ∈ F when F is coherent,
3. Given X and B ⊂ Ω , compute P(X|B) from F using expression (15) when this set is coherent.
It is important to remark that F can be any set of gambles. This set is not necessarily generated from a family
of conditional lower previsions assessments. If that were the case, in step 3 we would be computing the natural
extension E(X|B). As this is not always the case, we have used the notation P(X|B) of expression (15).
The answer to the second question is immediate if we can answer the first one, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 12. If F is an arbitrary set of gambles such that F is coherent, then X ∈ F if and only if F ∪ {−X} is not coherent.
Proof. If X ∈ F , then X,−X ∈ F ∪ {−X}, and X − X = 0 ∈ F ∪ {−X}. So this set is not coherent.
On the other hand, if F ∪ {−X} is not coherent, then 0 ∈ F ∪ {−X}. This set is equal to all the gambles Y = αZ − βX ,
where Z ∈ F and α, β ≥ 0, α > 0 or β > 0. In particular, there must be α, β such that 0 = αZ − βX , where Z ∈ F . Since
F is coherent, β = 0, so we get X = α
β
Z , and by Axiom D3, X ∈ F . 
So X ∈ F can be obtained by determining whether F ∪ {−X} is not coherent. It is possible that a direct algorithm for
checking X ∈ F exists. This could be more efficient than checking that F ∪ {−X} is not coherent. Our intuition, is that both
conditions are so closely related that it is difficult to find advantages in a direct check of X ∈ F . The only fact that could
be exploited is that this task is only considered when F is coherent. However, at present we do not know how to use the
coherence of F to improve the algorithmic efficiency in an algorithm designed to check the coherence of F ∪ {−X}.
A coherent set of gamblesD contains an uncountable number of gambles. If we want to represent them in a computer in
order to manipulate them using algorithms, we need to determine a procedure to represent a coherent set of gambles D by
means of a set F such thatD = F , and also to represent the set F in some formal language. A basic issue is to determine the
type of sets F we are going to consider and the representation we are going to use. For sets of almost desirable gambles, we
can start with a finite set of gambles F (which can be represented by enumerating the gambles in the set F). We could also
use finite sets of desirable gambles, but their representation capabilities would be too limited, as shown in the following
example.
Example 3. Let us assume that we know that P(B) = 0 (B = Ω) and we do not have any additional piece of information,
in such a way that P(X) = supω∈Ω\B X(ω). Then the only possible set of coherent desirable gambles representing this fact
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should include all the gambles  − B for any  > 0 (they have positive lower prevision), but not the gamble in the limit−B
(because in that case the set would not avoid partial loss). The situation is different with almost desirable gambles, since
−B (B = Ω) can belong to a coherent set of almost desirable gambles and we do not need to include gambles  − B in F
(they can be deduced from −B by natural extension). So this fact can be represented with a finite set of almost desirable
gambles, but not with a finite set of desirable gambles.
If we start with a finite set of gambles and compute its natural extension, then some of the basic pieces of information
cannot be represented. In this paper, we want to point out a representation scheme which is enough for some of the most
usual types of information and for which there are efficient algorithms in the literature. However, as we will see later, it is
not general enough for representing all the coherent sets of desirable gambles.
Definition 1. A basic set of gambles is a set of gambles FX,B = {X + B :  > 0}, where X is a gamble and B ⊆ Ω . This set
of gambles will be denoted as (X, B).
When B = ∅, we have a single gamble, X . Otherwise, (X, B) is an infinite set with X in the limit.
The representationwepropose is based on considering setsF given by the union of a finite family of basic sets of gambles:
(X1, B1), . . . , (Xk, Bk).
In Section 3was shown that the assignment P(X|B) = c can be represented bymeans of the set of gambles {(X−c+)B :
 > 0} and this set of gambles is equal to the basic set of gambles ((X − c)B, B). By conjugacy, P(X|B) = c is represented
by means of ((c − X)B, B).
The coherence of the set of gambles generated by a finite set of basic gambles, (X1, B1), . . . , (Xk, Bk),
1 is equivalent to
the fact that the null gamble does not belong to the set of gambles generated by these gambles, which can be checked by
showing that the following system in λi and i has no solution:
k∑
i=1
λi(Xi + iBi) ≤ 0
λi ≥ 0, i > 0
{i : λi = 0} = ∅
(17)
This is due to the fact that the set of gambles
∑k
i=1 λi(Xi + Bi) where λi ≥ 0, i > 0 is the set of gambles generated
by the finite set of basic gambles by applying Axioms D3 and D4. So, we are checking whether the null gamble is contained
in the natural extension.
This system can be simplified taking into account that if it has a solution, there is a solution for which all the i are equal:
It is enough to replace each i by the value  = minki=1 i. So, the existence of a solution for (17) is equivalent to the existence
of a solution for the following system:
k∑
i=1
λi(Xi + Bi) ≤ 0
λi ≥ 0,  > 0
{i : λi = 0} = ∅
(18)
An algorithm to solve this system is given by Walley et al. [15, Algorithm 2]. They designed the algorithm to check the
consistency of a set of lower prevision assessments, P(Ai|Bi) = ci. The consistency condition they consider is avoiding
uniform loss, but to check it, they build a system completely analogous to the above one, in which set {P(Ai|Bi) = ci}ki=1
is transformed into the inequality
∑k
i=1 λi(Xi + Bi) ≤ 0 in the system, where Xi = (Ai − ci)Bi. Their gambles are not as
general as the gambles we are considering here. For example, in their case, the gambles can have, at most, three different
values, and in our case we allow any type of gamble for Xi. Furthermore, we allow Bi = ∅ and this in impossible in [15].
However, the proposed algorithm neither depends on the particular type of gambles they use, nor on the fact that Bi = ∅.
So, the same algorithm can be used to check whether system (18) can be solved.
The basis of the algorithm is to find the largest subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} for which the following system can be solved:
∑
i∈I
λi(Xi + Bi) ≤ 0
∀i ∈ I, λi > 0,  > 0
(19)
There is such a largest set I: If we can find parameters satisfying the inequality for I1 and I2, then it is possible to find
the parameters for I1 ∪ I2. If the largest set is empty, then system (18) cannot be solved and the set of generated gambles is
coherent. If I is not empty, the system can be solved and the set of generated gambles is not coherent. The largest subset is
called I0. Algorithm 1 computes this set and checks coherence of a finite set of basic gambles, (X1, B1), . . . , (Xk, Bk).
1 We are considering coherence of the generated set of gambles and not the usual notion of coherence for conditional previsions which implies that none of
the initial statements is strictly redundant.
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Algorithm 1. Checking coherence
(1) Consider I = {1, . . . , k}.
(2) Solve the following linear programming problem:
maximize
∑
i∈I τi
subject to
∑
i∈I(λiXi + τiBi) ≤ 0
λi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1 (i ∈ I)
(20)
(3) If in the optimal solution τi = 1 for all i ∈ I, then I0 = I is the largest set for which system (19) can be solved, and
the set of generated gambles is incoherent.
(4) If τi = 0 for some i ∈ I, then consider I′ = {i ∈ I : τi = 1}.
(a) If I′ = ∅, then replace I by I′ and go to step 2.
(b) If I′ = ∅, then I0 = ∅ and the generated set of desirable gambles is coherent.
This algorithm runs at most for k iterations, as the size of I is reduced at least by 1 in each iteration. So, coherence can be
checked using a sequence of at most k linear programming problems.
The correctness of the algorithm is based on Lemmas 23–25 proved in Appendix A.
Now, we consider the problem of computing a conditional lower prevision P(X|B) from a finite family of basic sets of
gambles: (X1, B1), . . . , (Xk, Bk). Computing P(X|B) requires solving the following optimization problem (we are computing
the supremum value of α such that (X − α)B is desirable in the natural extension of the basic gambles):
maximize α
subject to
∑k
i=1 λi(Xi + Bi) ≤ (X − α)B
 > 0, λi ≥ 0
(21)
Walley et al. also propose algorithms to solve an optimization problem completely analogous to this one that can be
easily adapted [15, Algorithm 4]. The details are depicted in Algorithm 2.
The conditions for which this algorithm gives the correct answer are given by Walley et al. [15]. As in this paper, the
problem is stated in more general conditions than in [15], we give and prove the main result (Lemma 26) guaranteeing that
the algorithm is correct in Appendix A. In Lemma 26we have only focused on the aspects related to our algorithm. The result
is a combination of results contained in Lemmas 5 and 6 of [15], but with a more direct and simpler exposition.
A basic question is whether there are relatively simple sets of gambles which cannot be covered with this representation
based on basic sets of gambles. The following example shows a simple case in which there is no obvious solution if we use
this representation.
Example 4. Consider Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} and the two gambles X1, X2 given by X1(ω1) = 1, X1(ω2) = −1, X1(ω3) =
0, X1(ω4) = 0 and X2(ω1) = 0, X2(ω2) = 0, X2(ω3) = 1, X2(ω4) = −1. Consider the coherent set of desirable gambles
D given by all the gambles Z ≥ λ1X1 + λ2X2, where λ1, λ2 > 0. This situation can be a reasonable set of gambles for the
following case: We have one urn with balls of four different colours (the elements of Ω). We know that the number of balls
Algorithm 2. Computing conditional previsions
(1) Consider I = {1, . . . , k}
(2) Solve the following linear programming problem:
maximize
∑
i∈I τi
subject to
∑
i∈I(λiXi + τiBi)Bc ≤ 0
λi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1 (i ∈ I)
where Bc is the complement of B.
(3) If τi = 1 for any i in I, then go to step 4. Otherwise, replace I by the set {i ∈ I : τi = 1} and go to step 2.
(4) Return the optimal value of the following linear programming problem:
Maximize α
subject to
∑
i∈I λiXi ≤ (X − α)B
λi ≥ 0 (i ∈ I)
(22)
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of colour ω2 (ω4) is not higher than the number of balls of colour ω1 (ω3) and that we have that either the number of balls
of colour ω1 is strictly greater than the number of balls of colour ω2 or the number of balls of colour ω3 is (strictly) greater
than the number of balls of colour ω4. So it is reasonable not to accept each of the gambles X1 or X2 by itself (the lower
prevision is 0), but accept instead any combination λ1X1 + λ2X2 (its lower prevision is always positive).
We will suppose that there exists a finite set of basic sets of gambles (Y1, B1), . . . , (Yk, Bk) generating D, and we will
get a contradiction. If Yi + Bi ∈ D for any  > 0, then Yi + (1/n)Bi ∈ D for any n > 0. Taking into account the definition
of D, for any n, there are λn1, λn2 > 0 such that Yi + (1/n)Bi ≥ λn1X1 + λn2X2. Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we then
observe that Yi(ω1) ≥ −Yi(ω2), Yi(ω3) ≥ −Yi(ω4), Yi(ω1) ≥ 0, Yi(ω3) ≥ 0.
Now consider the sequence of gambles {X1 + (1/n)X2}n∈N.
Each gamble Zn = X1+(1/n)X2 should be generated by the family of gambles. So, there should exist valuesαni ≥ 0, ni ≥
0, such that,
Zn = X1 + (1/n)X2 ≥
k∑
i=1
(αni Yi + ni Bi)
WehaveZn(ω1) = −Zn(ω2)andZn(ω3) = −Zn(ω4),Yi(ω1) ≥ −Yi(ω2),Yi(ω3) ≥ −Yi(ω4)andalsoBi(ω1) ≥ −Bi(ω2),
Bi(ω3) ≥ −Bi(ω4). If any of these inequalities for Yi or Bi were strict, taking into account that the coefficients are positive, we
would have Zn(ω1) > −Zn(ω2) or Zn(ω3) > −Zn(ω4). So, if αni > 0, we must have Yi(ω1) = −Yi(ω2), Yi(ω3) = −Yi(ω4),
and Bi = ∅.
Let us call Jn = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, αni > 0} and J =
⋃
n Jn. We have that Zn = X1 + (1/n)X2 = ∑i∈Jn αni Yi, where
Yi(ω1) = −Yi(ω2), Yi(ω3) = −Yi(ω4); since Yi ∈ D, we also have Yi(ω1) > 0, Yi(ω3) > 0. As J is a finite set and for any i
in J we have that Yi(ω1) > 0, Yi(ω3) > 0, then inf{ Yi(ω3)Yi(ω1) : i ∈ J} = γ > 0.
Since Zn = ∑i∈Jn αni Yi, then
Zn(ω3)
Zn(ω1)
=
∑
i∈Jn αni Yi(ω3)∑
i∈Jn αni Yi(ω1)
Since
Yi(ω3)
Yi(ω1)
≥ γ > 0,wewill alsohave that Zn(ω3)
Zn(ω1)
> γ > 0.But Zn(ω3)
Zn(ω1)
= 1/n,which is incontradictionwith the fact that
this fraction is always greater or equal than a valueγ > 0. So,D cannot be generatedby afinite family of basic sets of gambles.
We could enlarge the set of finitely generated sets of gambles, considering that a set of gambles D is finitely generated if
it can be obtained with the application of a finite sequence of the following rules:
1. If X is a gamble, the set of gambles generated by X: {X} is finitely generated.
2. IfD1 andD2 arefinitely generated, then the set of gambles generatedby its union,D1 ∪ D2, is alsofinitely generated.
3. If D1, . . . ,Dk are finitely generated, then the set R(D1, . . . ,Dk) = {∑ki=1 iXi : i > 0, Xi ∈ Di} is also finitely
generated.
Observe that R(D1, . . . ,Dk) does not always contains sets D1, . . . ,Dk , as all i values must be always strictly greater
than 0. D1 ∪ D2 and R(D1,D2) are comprised of gambles 1X1 + 2X2, where X1 ∈ D1, X2 ∈ D2, the difference being that,
in the former, 1 or 2 (but not both) can be equal to 0, and in the latter, both 1 and 2 must be strictly greater than 0.
To represent a finitely generated set of gambles we are going to use sets of lists of gambles L = (X1, . . . , Xk). Each list L
represents what we will call an open set of gambles: The set R(L) of all the gambles Z = ∑ki=1 iXi where i > 0.
A set of lists of gambles {L1, . . . , Lm} will represent the set of gambles generated by the union of the sets represented
by the lists: (R(L1) ∪ · · · ∪ R(Lm)). The following result shows that a set of lists can generate any finitely generated set of
gambles.
Theorem 13. D is a finitely represented set of gambles if and only if it can be represented by a set of lists {L1, . . . , Lm}, where
each list is of the form Li = (Xi1, . . . , Xiki).
Proof. If D can be represented as a set of lists, then it is immediate to show that it is finitely generated: The set generated
by a gamble Xij is finitely generated (rule 1), the set represented by a list Li is finitely generated (application of rule 3 to the
sets generated by its single gambles), and hence the set represented by a set of lists is finitely generated too (application of
rule 2 to the set associated to each list).
Conversely, if D is finitely generated, it can be represented by a set of lists:
1. If D = {X} where X is a gamble, then D can be represented by the list (X).
2. If D = D1 ∪ D2, where D1 and D2 are finitely generated and can be represented by sets of lists S1 = {L1, . . . , Lr}
and S2 = {L′1, . . . , L′s} respectively, then it is immediate to see that D = D1 ∪ D2 is generated by the set of lists
S1 ∪ S2.
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3. If D = R(D1, . . . ,Dk) where D1, . . . ,Dk are finitely generated and each Di is represented by the set of lists{Li1, . . . , Liri}, then D = R(D1, . . . ,Dk) can be represented by the set of lists {L1j1 . . . . .Lkjk : 1 ≤ ji ≤ ri}
where L1j1 . . . . .L
k
jk
represents the concatenation of the lists (if L1 = (X11 , . . . , X1k ) and L2 = (X21 , . . . , X2k ), then
L1.L2 = (X11 , . . . , X1k , X21 , . . . , X2k ).)
This recursive argument shows that any finitely generated set of gambles D can always be represented by a set of lists
(some details of the representations are omitted as they represent simple computations but with a complex notation). 
5. Maximal sets of gambles
In this section we will investigate maximal coherent sets of gambles. These sets of gambles represent complete uncertain
knowledge: Adding a single gamble more will give rise to an incoherent set. The associated credal sets are singletons,
i.e. consisting of just one linear prevision (probability measure). But we will also be able to associate finite sequences of
probability measures similar to the ones considered by Krauss [9] and Coletti and Scozzafava [2].
Definition 2. We will say that a set of desirable gambles D is maximal if it is coherent and there is no X ∈ D such that
D ∪ {X} is coherent.
Lemma 14. If D is coherent, −X ∈ D, and X = 0, then D ∪ {X} is coherent.
Proof. Let us check it by contradiction. Let us suppose that D ∪ {X} is not coherent. Then there exists a collection of non-
negative numbers c1, . . . , cn, cn+1 and gambles Xi ∈ D, i = 1, . . . , n, such that∑ni=1 ciXi + cn+1X = 0, where one of the
ci’s is non-zero. Furthermore, according to the coherence of D, cn+1 = 0. And since X = 0, one of the ci, i = 1, . . . , n is
also different from 0. Thus, −X can be written as follows: −X = ∑ni=1 cicn+1 Xi. Then, by the coherence of D, −X belongs to
it, and we get a contradiction. 
Theorem 15. A coherent set of gambles D is maximal if and only if either X ∈ D or −X ∈ D, for all X ∈ L, X = 0.
Proof. Let us suppose thatD ismaximal and X ∈ D. Then, by definition, (D ∪ {X}) is not coherent. Thus, according to Lemma
14, −X must belong to D. On the other hand, if for any X ∈ L, either X ∈ D or −X ∈ D, then D is maximal, since X ∈ D
implies that −X ∈ D; hence, D ∪ {X} cannot be coherent. 
If D is a coherent set of gambles and B ⊆ Ω , then DB is a coherent set of gambles defined on the same frame Ω; but
when B is known, we could restrict the frame of discernment to B. A gamble X defined on B is a mapping X : B → R. The set
of all the gambles with frame B is denoted by LB. The extension to Ω of a gamble X defined on B is the gamble XΩ defined
as XΩ(ω) = X(ω) if ω ∈ B and XΩ(ω) = 0 otherwise. If D is a coherent set of gambles, let us define the conditional set
of desirable gambles restricted to B as the coherent set of desirable gambles D′B consisting of those gambles in frame B such
that XΩ ∈ D. It is immediate to show thatD′B is a coherent set of gambles but with frame B instead ofΩ .D′B contains all the
relevant information to determine the behavior conditioned to B; in fact, if C ⊆ B, then P(C|B) can be computed from either
D′B or DB, giving rise to the same result.
Lemma 16. If D is maximal, then D′B is maximal for all B ⊆ Ω, B = ∅.
Proof. First, if D is coherent we have that D′B is coherent too. Furthermore, if X ∈ LB, X = 0, then XΩ = 0 and XΩ ∈ D or
−XΩ ∈ D, so X ∈ D′B or −X ∈ D′B, and D′B is maximal by Theorem 15. 
Lemma 17. Let D be a maximal set of gambles and B ⊆ Ω . Let P(.|B) and P(.|B) be respectively the lower and upper previsions
associated to DB. Then P(X|B) = P(X|B), ∀ X ∈ L.
Proof. Let us prove it by contradiction. Let us suppose that there exists some X ⊆ Ω such that P(X|B) < P(X|B). Then, for
all p ∈ (P(X|B), P(X|B)), (X − p)B ∈ D and −(X − p)B = (p − X)B ∈ D. According to Theorem 15, D cannot be maximal.

If we have a sequence of nested sets Ω = C0 ⊃ C1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Cn = ∅, and B ⊆ Ω , then the layer of B with respect to this
sequence will be the minimum value of i such that B ∩ (Ci \ Ci+1) = ∅. It will be denoted by layer(B). It is immediate to
show that if layer(B) = i, then B ⊆ Ci: If there is an element of ω ∈ B that does not belong to Ci, then this element must
belong to a Cj with j < i. If j0 is the largest of the values j such thatω ∈ Cj , thenwe have that j0 < i and B∩ (Cj0 \Cj0+1) = ∅,
which contradicts the fact that i is the minimum value for which B ∩ (Ci \ Ci+1) = ∅.
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Theorem 18. If D is maximal then there is a sequence of nested sets Ω = C0 ⊃ C1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Cn = ∅ and a sequence of
probability measures P0, . . . , Pn−1 satisfying the following conditions:
1. For each probability Pi, Pi(Ci \ Ci+1) = 1, Pi({ω}) > 0 for any ω ∈ Ci \ Ci+1,
2. For each A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω , if i = layer(B), then P(A|B) = P(A|B) = Pi(A|B), where P(A|B) and P(A|B) are the lower and
upper probabilities computed from DB.
Proof. According to Lemma 17, the lower and the upper probabilities associated to D do coincide: P(X) = P(X). P0 is the
additive probability defined by P0 = P = P. Let C1 ⊂ Ω be the subset of elements of probability 0, C1 = {ω ∈ Ω :
P0({ω}) = 0}. If C1 = ∅, by Lemma 17, P(X|C1) = P(X|C1) and P1 is defined by P1 = P(·|C1) = P(·|C1). Next, we define
C2 = {ω ∈ Ω : P1({ω}) = 0}. If this set is non-empty, we can repeat the same process again and get a strictly decreasing
finite sequence of nonempty sets Ci and an associated finite family of probability measures Pi. (Note that, after a finite
sequence of n steps, the set Cn will be the empty set and the process will be finished.)
On the other hand, if B ⊆ Ω and i is the layer of B, then we have that B ⊆ Ci and Pi(B) > 0 (remember that Ci+1 is the
subset of Ci given by the ω ∈ Ci such that Pi({ω}) = 0). Probability Pi is defined on Ci and as it is associated to DCi and D is
maximal, we have that P(A|Ci) = P(A|Ci) = Pi(A|Ci) = Pi(A) for any A ⊆ Ci. As Pi(B) > 0, its lower conditional probability
is greater than 0, and by Corollary 9, the conditional probability can be computed by conditioning in the associated credal
set, obtaining the desired result:
Pi(A|B) = P(A|Ci ∩ B) = P(A|Ci ∩ B) = P(A|B) = P(A|B) 
This theorem shows that there is a strong connection between maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles and the se-
quence of probabilities associated to a coherent set of conditional assessments given by Krauss [9] and Coletti and Scozzafava
[2]. The layer of B is also the minimum value of i for which Pi(B) > 0, and therefore is the equivalent concept to the zero
layer of B proposed by these authors. However, there are some differences between the two models as we will show later:
We can have the same sequence of probabilities associated to different maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles.
In the following we show that any coherent set of gambles is the intersection of a family of coherent maximal sets of
gambles. First, we need a technical result.
Lemma 19. If D is coherent and −X, X ∈ D, and X = 0, then D+X = (D ∪ {X} ∪ {−X + Y : Y ∈ D}) is coherent, X ∈ D+X
and D ⊆ D+X .
Proof. If this set is not coherent, then we have that there are α1, α2, α3 ≥ 0, and Y1, Y2 ∈ D such that α1Y1 + α2X +
α3(−X + Y2) ≤ 0, and at least one of the αi is not equal to 0.
From this inequality we have that: α1Y1 + α3Y2 ≤ (α3 − α2)X .
First, notice that α1, α3 cannot be both equal to 0, because otherwise 0 ≤ (−α2)X , and as X = 0 and α2 = 0, we have
that −X ∈ D, which is in contradiction with the fact that −X, X ∈ D.
Then, at least one of the values α1, α3 is different from 0, and thus α1Y1 + α3Y2 ∈ D; therefore, (α3 − α2)X ∈ D.
Three situations are now possible:
• α3 = α2, which is in contradiction with the fact that D is coherent.• (α3 − α2) > 0, which is in contradiction with the fact that D is coherent and X ∈ D.• (α2 − α3) > 0, which is in contradiction with the fact that D is coherent and −X ∈ D.
In any case, we arrive to a contradiction, so D+X must be coherent.
We also have that X ∈ D+X and D ⊆ D+X by the definition of D+X . 
Theorem 20. Let D be a coherent set of gambles. Then there exists at least one maximal set of gambles containing it.
Proof. Let us start with a coherent set D and then repeat the following process where initially k = 1 and Dk = D:
1. If for all gambles X (X = 0) we have that X ∈ Dk or −X ∈ Dk , then Dk is maximal and contains D. The procedure
stops.
2. Select a gamble Xk such that −Xk, Xk ∈ Dk and X = 0.
3. Make Dk+1 = D+Xkk . By Lemma 19, this new set is coherent and contains Dk and therefore D.
4. k = k + 1.
5. Go to step 1.
The main point of this procedure is that it arrives at a maximal coherent set after a finite number of steps. This result is
based on the fact that if in the first k + 1 iterations of this process we select gambles X1, X2, . . . , Xk+1, then these gambles
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are linearly independent. This fact is obtained by proving that after having added X1, . . . , Xk , then for any linear combination
of these gambles Y = ∑ki=1 αiXi, and Y = 0, we have that either Y ∈ Dk or −Y ∈ Dk . So, in step 2, we have to select a
gamble which is linearly independent of the previously selected ones.
This is going to be proved by induction in k. For k = 1, Y = α1X1. Then if α1 > 0, Y ∈ D1, and if α1 < 0, then−Y ∈ D1.
α1 cannot be equal to 0 because Y = 0.
Now, assume that it is true for the first k gambles X1, . . . , Xk , and let us prove it for X1, X2, . . . , Xk+1.
Let us assume that Y = ∑k+1i=1 αiXi, and let Z =
∑k
i=1 αiXi.
If αi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then Y = αk+1Xk+1 and we are in a situation similar to the case k = 1.
If some αi with i ≤ k is different from 0, then by induction, we have that either Z or −Z is in Dk ⊆ Dk+1 after adding
X1, . . . , Xk .
We have that Y = Z + αk+1Xk+1. The following situations are possible:
• αk+1 = 0, then Y = Z and we have that either Y or −Y is in Dk ⊆ Dk+1.• αk+1 > 0 and Z ∈ Dk , then by coherence Y ∈ Dk+1.• αk+1 > 0 and −Z ∈ Dk , then −Y = −Z − αk+1Xk+1. Consider the gamble −Y/αk+1 = −Z/αk+1 − Xk+1. As−Z ∈ Dk and αk+1 > 0, then −Z/αk+1 ∈ Dk , therefore taking into account the definition of D+Xk+1 , we obtain−Y/αk+1 ∈ D+Xk+1 . Now, as D+Xk+1 is coherent, −Y ∈ D+Xk+1 .• αk+1 < 0 and −Z ∈ Dk , then by coherence −Y ∈ D+Xk+1 .• αk+1 < 0 and Z ∈ Dk , then taking into account that−1/αk+1 > 0, we obtain that−Y/αk+1 = −Xk+1 − Z/αk+1 ∈
D+Xk+1 and multiplying gamble −Y/αk+1 by −1/αk+1 > 0, Y ∈ D+Xk+1 .
As we always choose a gamble that is linearly independent of the previous one, and because Ω is finite, the dimension
of L as a linear space is finite, and so the process has to stop after a finite number of steps. 
Theorem 21. Let D be a coherent set of gambles. Then D = ∩i∈IDi, where {Di : i ∈ I} is the class of maximal sets of gambles
containing D.
Proof.Weonly have to check the inclusion∩i∈IDi ⊆ D.Wewill prove it by contradiction. Let us suppose thatX ∈ ∩i∈IDi\D.
Then, by Lemma 14, D ∪ {−X} is coherent. By Theorem 20 there exists at least one maximal set of gambles containing
D ∪ {−X}. This maximal set coincides with one of the Di, for some i ∈ I. Then there exists some i ∈ I such that −X ∈ Di.
This contradicts the assumption of coherence of Di. 
This theorem can be the basis for obtaining a representation of gambles analogous to the credal sets for sets of almost
desirable gambles. Now, a coherent set of gambles can be expressed as a family of maximally coherent sets of gambles,
each with an associated sequence of probability measures. There are important issues to be solved. One of them is that a
maximally consistent coherent set of gambles is not exactly equivalent to a sequence of probabilitymeasures as the following
example shows.
Example5. Let us assume thatΩ = {ω1, ω2} and theprobability givenbyP0({ω1}) = P0({ω2}) = 0.5 (only oneprobability
in the sequence). It is clear that any gamble with X(ω1) + X(ω2) > 0 should be desirable, but this probability does not
determine whether the gamble Y(ω1) = 1, Y(ω2) = −1 is desirable or not. We can have a coherent set in which neither Y
nor −Y is desirable, another coherent set in which Y is desirable, and still another in which −Y is desirable. Only the last
two are maximal.
An alternative model that allows to establish a correspondence between maximally coherent sets of gambles and se-
quences of probability measures is obtained bymaking the consistency AxiomD1 stronger, modifying it to get the following
version:
D1”. If X ∈ D, then there is an  > 0 such that −X +  supp(X) ∈ D, where supp(X) = {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) = 0}.
This consistency condition is stronger than Axiom D1 and it implies that the null gamble is not desirable (if X = 0, then
−X +  supp(X) = 0, and under Axiom D1”, if 0 ∈ D, we obtain a contradiction). Axiom D1 assumes that we cannot have
X and−X as desirable, while Axiom D1” says that we cannot have that X is desirable if−X is the limit of desirable gambles
with the same support, i.e. if −X +  supp(X) ∈ D for any  > 0.
The support is necessary inAxiomD1”: If it hadbeen stated saying that ifX ∈ D, then there is  > 0, such that−X+ ∈ D
(as in strict desirability axioms), then it would have become too strong a condition. Let us suppose that P0(B) = 0; this
implies that −B +  is also desirable for any  > 0. But B ∈ D, so this stronger separation condition without considering
the support would not be fulfilled.
The following theorem shows that a sequence of probability measures such as the one generated in Theorem 18 can
always be represented using a unique maximally coherent set of gambles among those satisfying D1”.
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Theorem 22. If we have a sequence of nested sets Ω = C0 ⊃ C1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Cn = ∅ and a sequence of probability measures
P0, . . . , Pn−1 satisfying the following condition:
• for any i, Pi(Ci \ Ci+1) = 1, and ∀ω ∈ Ci \ Ci+1, Pi({ω}) > 0,
then the set of gambles D = {X ∈ L : Pi(X) > 0, where i = layer(supp(X))} is the only maximally coherent set of desirable
gambles among those satisfying Axiom D1” such that for any i the credal set associated to DCi contains only the probability
measure Pi.
Proof. First, it is easy to prove that this set of gambles satisfies all the axioms for coherence, including Axiom D1”. We will
only consider this D1”. If X ∈ D, then Pi(X) > 0, where i is the layer of supp(X). Consider gambles (−X +  supp(X)). We
have that Pi(−X +  supp(X)) = −Pi(X) + Pi(supp(X)) < 0 if we choose  > 0 small enough. If  is selected such that
 < min{X(ω) : X(ω) > 0} we also have that supp(−X +  supp(X)) = supp(X) and both supports have the same layer.
Therefore, there is an  > 0 such that −X +  supp(X) ∈ D.
Now, we prove that the only probability in the credal set associated to DCi is Pi. Assume that Q ∈ PDCi . As − + Ci is in
DCi for any , then we have that Q(− + Ci) = Q(Ci) −  ≥ 0, for any . As a consequence, Q(Ci) = 1 and Q(ω) = 0 if
ω ∈ Ci. If ω ∈ Ci, consider any positive real value 1 > a > 0. The layer of {ω} − aCi is Ci. We are going to prove that if
ω ∈ Ci and Pi(ω) > a, then Q(ω) ≥ a, and if Pi(ω) < a, then Q(ω) ≤ a. This is enough to deduce that Q(ω) = Pi(ω) for
any ω ∈ Ci.
• If Pi(ω) > a, then Pi({ω} − aCi) > 0, and {ω} − aCi ∈ D, and since the support of {ω} − aCi is Ci, we also have{ω} − aCi ∈ DCi . As Q ∈ PDCi , we have that Q({ω} − aCi) = Q(ω) − a ≥ 0, and therefore Q(ω) ≥ a.• If Pi(ω) < a, then Pi(−{ω} + aCi) > 0, and −{ω} + aCi ∈ DCi . Therefore, Q(−{ω} + aCi) = −Q(ω) + a ≥ 0 and
Q(ω) ≤ a.
As we have that ∀ω ∈ Ci, Q(ω) = Pi(ω), and Pi(Ci) = Qi(Ci) = 1, then necessarily Q = Pi. So, the only probability in
PDCi is Pi.
Now we prove that set D is unique. Assume that D′ is a coherent set such that for any i the credal set associated to D′Ci is
the singleton {Pi} and satisfies AxiomD1”. Assume a gamble X and consider i = layer(supp(X)). We have that supp(X) ⊆ Ci
and we can consider three situations:
1. X is such that Pi(X) > 0. Then X ∈ D′Ci and by definition XCi ∈ D′. As supp(X) ⊆ Ci, we have that XCi = X and
thus X ∈ D′.
2. X is such that Pi(X) < 0. Then X ∈ D′Ci . As supp(X) ⊆ Ci, we also have that X ∈ D′.
3. X is such that Pi(X) = 0. As i = layer(supp(X)) there is a ω ∈ Ci \ Ci+1 such that X(ω) > 0. We also have
that Pi({ω}) > 0, so for any  > 0, Pi(−X +  supp(X)) = Pi(−X) +  supp(X) =  supp(X) > 0 and
therefore −X +  supp(X) ∈ D′Ci . As supp(−X +  supp(X)) ⊆ supp(X), and supp(X) ⊆ Ci, we also have that
supp(−X +  supp(X)) ⊆ Ci. From this inclussion and the fact that −X +  supp(X) ∈ D′Ci we can deduce that−X +  supp(X) ∈ D′ (for any  > 0). Now, taking into account that D′ satisfies Axiom D1”, we have that X ∈ D′.
As a consequence, D′ obeys the same criteria as D to determine whether a gamble belongs to it (Pi(X) > 0) and thus
D = D′.
To prove that D is maximal, consider a gamble X ∈ D. This gamble has to satisfy Pi(X) ≤ 0 where i = layer(supp(X)).
By following an argument analogous to the one used in the third situation of the uniqueness proof, we can deduce that
−X +  supp(X) ∈ D, for any  > 0. So there can not be a coherent set containing D ∪ {X} and satisfying Axiom A1”. 
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented some basic concepts of the theory of sets of desirable gambles, or desirability. We have
tried to show that this approach can shed light on some important notions in imprecise probability, such as conditioning
and events of probability 0. It can also be useful for showing the relationships with other approaches, such as probabilistic
coherence [2]. Muchwork remains to be done,mainly on the design and implementation of algorithms.We have shown here
some existing algorithms that can be directly applied to some restricted forms of coherent sets. However, it is necessary to
determine whether this restriction is too severe to leave out some important real situations. Also, it would be interesting to
determine some additional axioms under which the representation based on what we have called basic sets of gambles is
enough to cover any possible set of desirable gambles.
As we have mentioned, Moral [10] studied the concept of epistemic irrelevance and independence taking desirability as
a basis. An important problem for the future is how to use graphical models to represent and use epistemic independence
assessments in the computation of conditional sets of desirable gambles.
I. Couso, S. Moral / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1034–1055 1053
Acknowledgments
This paper is an extended version of a paper entitled “Sets of Desirable Gambles and Credal Sets” which was presented
at the ISIPTA 09 conference [6]. This work has been jointly supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science
under project TIN2007-67418-C03-03, by the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER), and by the Spanish research
programme Consolider Ingenio 2010: MIPRCV (CSD2007-00018). We are very grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this
paper for their thorough work that helped us to correct and improve it.
Appendix A Proofs of algorithms correctness
Lemma 23. If the optimum of problem (20) is obtained for a set of parameters (λi, τi)i∈I , then τi = 1 if τi > 0.
Proof. This is a consequence of the fact that, if the parameters (λi, τi)i∈I are a feasible solution of the problem, so are the
parameters (λ′i, τ ′i )i∈I = (rλi,min{rτi, 1})i∈I for any r > 0. Furthermore, if r > 1, we have that
∑
i∈I τ ′i ≥
∑
i∈I τi. If,
besides r > 1, we have that there is a value i ∈ I such that 0 < τi < 1, we have that∑i∈I τ ′i >
∑
i∈I τi. So, if for a feasible
solution (λi, τi)i∈I there is a value i ∈ I such that 0 < τi < 1, making r large enough, we can obtain a feasible solution
(λ′i, τ ′i ) with
∑
i∈I τ ′i >
∑
i∈I τi and τ ′i = 1 if τi > 0. This fact proves that in the optimum of the above linear programming
problem, we have that τi = 1 if τi > 0. 
Lemma 24. If I contains the greatest set, I0, satisfying (19) and I
′ is computed as in step 3 of Algorithm 1, then I0 ⊆ I′.
Proof. Consider that
∑
i∈I0 λ1i (Xi + Bi) ≤ 0 for a set of parameters λ1i > 0 and  > 0 (we can assume that λ1i  ≤ 1 for any
i ∈ I0). Then, for any feasible solution of the optimization problem (20), with parameters (λ2i , τ 2i )i∈I , we can build another
feasible solution (λ3i , τ
3
i )i∈I with λ3i = (λ1i + λ2i )/2, τ 3i = (τ 2i + λ1i )/2 if i ∈ I0 and λ3i = λ1i /2, τ 3i = τ 2i /2 if i ∈ I − I0.
This new feasible solution ensures that τ 3i > 0 if either τ
2
i > 0 or i ∈ I0. Now, following a procedure analogous to the
one employed in Lemma 23, we can build a feasible solution (λ4i , τ
4
i )i∈I in which τ 4i = 1 if τ 2i > 0 or i ∈ I0. This implies
that
∑
i∈I τ 4i ≥
∑
i∈I τ 2i , for which this inequality becomes strict if there is a value i ∈ I0 such that τ 2i = 0 (or equivalently
τ 2i < 1). This implies that I0 ⊆ I′, as otherwise we would be able to build another feasible solution with a larger value of
the function we are maximizing. 
Since in the first iteration of the algorithm, we have I = {1, . . . , k} and trivially I0 ⊆ I, as a consequence of the above
lemma, I0 ⊆ I for each iteration of the algorithm.
Lemma 25. If the solution to system (20) is such that τi = 1, ∀i ∈ I, then I0 = I is the largest set for which system (19) has a
solution.
Proof. This is based on the fact that, under these conditions, the system (19) can be solved (we can select  small enough
so that λi ≤ 1 = τi for any i ∈ I). We have to take into account that if we replace τi by a smaller value λi, then∑
i∈I(λiXi + iλiBi) will be dominated a fortiori by 0.
The fact that I is the largest set for which there is solution is based on the fact that in each iteration the considered set I
must contain any set for which system (19) has a solution. 
The following lemma is the justification of Algorithm 2. As in this algorithm, we assume that we have a finite family of
basic sets of gambles (X1, B1), . . . , (Xk, Bk) and that we want to compute the conditional lower prevision P(X|B).
Lemma 26. There is amaximum set I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} for which there areλi > 0 (i ∈ I),  > 0 satisfying∑i∈I λi(Xi+Bi)Bc ≤
0. If I is such maximum set, then the maximum of the optimization problem (21) is equal to the maximum of the optimization
problem (22).
Proof. The fact that there is a maximum set I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, for which there are λi > 0 (i ∈ I),  > 0 satisfying∑
i∈I λi(Xi + Bi)Bc ≤ 0, can be easily checked by considering that if there are two sets I1 and I2 with two families of
parameters λ1i > 0 (i ∈ I1), 1 > 0 and λ2i > 0 (i ∈ I2), 2 > 0, then there is a set of parameters for I1 ∪ I2 satisfying the
inequality, where the parameters are computed as λ3i = (λ1i + λ2i )/2, 3 = min{1, 2}, where it is assumed λji = 0 if
i ∈ Ij .
To prove the equality of the optimal values of problems (21) and (22), we first prove that in problem (21) we can add that
λi = 0 for any i ∈ I. This is a consequence of the fact that if we have a set of parameters (λi)i∈{1,...,k},  > 0, for which
the restrictions in problem (21) are satisfied, then if J = {i : λi > 0}, we have that∑i∈J λi(Xi + Bi) ≤ (X − α)B. If both
members are multiplied by a positive function Bc , we obtain
∑
i∈J λi(Xi + Bi)Bc ≤ (X − α)BBc . Taking into account that
BBc = 0, we obtain that∑i∈J λi(Xi + Bi)Bc ≤ 0. As I is the maximum set for which this equality is satisfied, we have J ⊆ I
and λi = 0 for any i ∈ I.
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As a consequence of this fact, problem (21) is equivalent to:
maximize α
subject to:
∑
i∈I λi(Xi + Bi) ≤ (X − α)B
 > 0, λi ≥ 0
(23)
This problem is similar to problem (22) with the difference that linear restrictions contain Bi and are harder to satisfy,
so the maximum of (23) is lower or equal than the maximum of (22). To obtain the equality, we prove that for any δ > 0
and any feasible solution (λi)i∈I, α of problem (22) there will be a feasible solution (λ′i)i∈I,  > 0, α − δ of problem (23).
Assume that λ0i > 0, i ∈ I, 0 > 0 are such that
∑
i∈I λ0i (Xi + 0Bi)Bc ≤ 0.
We can assume that
∑
i∈I λ0i (Xi + 0Bi)B ≤ (δ/2)B since the above inequality is satisfied if λ0i is multiplied by any
positive constant.
The feasible solution (λ′i)i∈I,  > 0, α − δ is built as follows: λ′i = λi + λi0 and  > 0 is any value 0 <  < 0/2 small
enough so that
∑
i∈I
λiB ≤ (δ/2)B
∑
i∈I
(λiBi)B
c ≤∑
i∈I
λ0i ((
0/2)Bi)B
c
The second inequality is possible because ∀i ∈ I, λ0i > 0.
Now we have:
∑
i∈I
λ′i(Xi + Bi) =
∑
i∈I
(λi + λ0i )(Xi + Bi)
= ∑
i∈I
λiXi +
∑
i∈I
λiBiB +
∑
i∈I
λiBiB
c +∑
i∈I
λ0i (Xi + Bi)B +
∑
i∈I
λ0i (Xi + Bi)Bc
≤ (X − α)B + (δ/2)B +∑
i∈I
λ0i ((
0/2)Bi)B
c + (δ/2)B +∑
i∈I
λ0i (Xi + (0/2)Bi)Bc
≤ (X − (α − δ)B) +∑
i∈I
λ0i (
0Bi)B
c ≤ X − (α − δ)B
This shows that (λ′i)i∈I,  > 0, α − δ is also a feasible solution of (23). Therefore, if the maximum of problem (22)
is α, then the maximum of (23) is greater or equal than α − δ for any δ > 0. In conclusion, as we already showed that
the maximum of problem (22) was greater or equal than the maximum of (23), the maxima of both problems must be the
same. 
Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 2 compute the largest subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} for which there are λi ≥ 0,  > 0 such that
supω∈Bc
∑
i∈I(λiXi + Bi)Bc ≤ 0 with a process similar to the one used for checking coherence. Once this set has been
computed, the lower prevision can be computed by solving the linear programming problem in step 4, as the maximum of
this problem coincides with the maximum of problem (21).
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